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ABSTRACT This research concerns the detection of abnormal data usage and unauthorised access in 
large-scale critical networks, specifically healthcare infrastructures. Hospitals in the UK are now 
connecting their traditionally isolated equipment on a large scale to Internet-enabled networks to enable 
remote data access. This step-change makes sensitive data accessible to a broader spectrum of users. The 
focus of this research is on the safeguarding of Electronic Patient Record (EPR) systems in particular. With 
over 83% of hospitals adopting EPRs, access to this healthcare data needs to be proactively monitored for 
malicious activity. Hospitals must maintain patient trust and ensure that the information security principles 
of Integrity, Availability and Confidentiality are applied to EPR data. Access to EPR is often heavily 
audited within healthcare infrastructures. However, this data is regularly left untouched in a data silo and 
only ever accessed on an ad hoc basis. Without proactive monitoring of audit records, data breaches may go 
undetected. In addition, external threats, such as phishing or social engineering techniques to acquire a 
clinician’s logon credentials, need to be identified. Data behaviour within healthcare infrastructures 
therefore needs to be proactively monitored for malicious, erratic or unusual activity. This paper presents a 
system that employs a density-based local outlier detection model. The system is intended to add to the 
defence-in-depth of healthcare infrastructures. Patterns in EPR data are extracted to profile user behaviour 
and device interactions in order to detect and visualize anomalous activities. The system is able to detect 
144 anomalous behaviours in an unlabelled dataset of 1,007,727 audit logs. This includes 0.66% of the 
users on the system, 0.17% of patient record accesses, 0.74% of routine accesses, and 0.53% of the devices 
used in a specialist Liverpool (UK) hospital.  
INDEX TERMS Data Analysis, Electronic Patient Records, Healthcare Infrastructures, Information 
Security, Patient Privacy, Visualisation,
I. INTRODUCTION 
The health sector consistently receives the highest number of 
reported data security incidents [1], as the EPR data within 
represents some of the most sensitive and valuable data 
available. At the time of writing this paper, patient privacy 
within EPR systems is typically enforced through corrective 
mechanisms, managed through role-based access [2]. 
However, once a user has been authenticated, they are 
essentially afforded unhindered access. The wealth of 
personal information held is intrinsically valuable on the 
black market, often used for committing identity fraud. 
There is also a tendency for organisational complacency 
within healthcare towards patient privacy violations [3]. 
Recent attacks, such as the WannaCry campaign [4], have 
further reduced the levels of public trust in security leading to 
widespread concern about the health sector’s ability to 
maintain the privacy of patient data. Bell-LaPadula [5], and 
FairWarning [6], are the staple access control systems 
employed but are i) inflexible, presenting issues when 
considering the dynamic boundaries of many modern 
healthcare networks and ii) do not compensate for an attacker 
who has acquired the logon credentials of an approved 
clinician (e.g. through phishing or social engineering). This 
has been a challenge for security experts for many years, 
referred to as a plain recognition problem [7], Information 
Security Officers and IT Managers need to interpret disparate 
data behaviours to preserve privacy and safeguard EPR data 
[8]. They constantly balance privacy with a need for more 
intuitive security solutions. Therefore, confidentiality and 
patient privacy within EPR systems is typically managed 
through an agreed and signed code of practice between the 
organisation and its users [9]. 
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Patients need to be assured of three crucial security 
principles 1) the data stored is trustworthy and accurate. 2) 
Data can be reliably accessed by healthcare professionals 
when needed. 3) Only authorised healthcare professionals 
have access to the data, and only access it when it is 
appropriate to do so. Issues also surround data being 
exchanged across multiple countries that have different laws 
and regulations concerning data traversal, protection 
requirements, and privacy laws. 
The UK, specifically, is a significant contributor to data 
privacy and cyber security research with the establishment of 
14 cyber-security Centres of Excellence from 2011 to 2017 
[10], in addition to the formation of the Malvern Cyber 
Security Cluster in 2011 [11] and the North West Cyber 
Security Cluster in 2014 [12], as examples. The UK 
government does invest into cyber-security schemes, such as 
the £1.9billion investment into the national cyber security 
strategy, aiming to make the UK one of the safest places in 
the world to do business [13]. Yet within healthcare 
infrastructure, privacy and security are still seen as a 
secondary consideration, though the importance to establish 
data access regulations is imminent due to the geographical 
requirements for healthcare data being stored. Compliance 
with NHS guidelines, the Information Governance Toolkit, 
internal audit processes and information security standards 
(e.g. ISO27001 and ISO27002) is an additional concern to 
adhere to. 
The research presented in this paper demonstrates a 
system that utilises density-based outlier detection 
techniques and an advanced visualisation approach to 
safeguard patient privacy within EPR systems. Density-
based outlier detection can identify when a user’s behaviour 
has changed, by comparing behaviours, such as the type of 
actions being taken and the patients they are viewing. In 
this way, potentially illegitimate access to patient records 
can be highlighted and investigated. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II 
presents background research on patient privacy within 
EPR systems, the complexity of EPR data and the network 
structures in a typical UK hospital. Section III outlines the 
methodology and systematic approach. Section IV discusses 
our results and a case study. Section V outlines our 
conclusions and the future work to be done.  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Machine learning algorithms observe and learn data 
patterns and profile users’ behaviour, which can then be 
denoted. Combined with cloud infrastructure and data 
visualisation, the way large datasets are understood is being 
transformed, allowing extraction of otherwise unobtainable 
meaning from vast quantities of information. This is now a 
proven approach for detecting zero day attacks and 
uncovering unknown threats [14]. There is a large volume 
of literature concerning big-data-based privacy-preserving 
machine learning algorithms. Genetics-based machine 
learning (GBML) [15], clustering fuzzy rule-based 
classifiers [16] and Linear Support Vector Machines 
(SVMs) [17] are examples of the general conventional 
means of choice for researchers. Further to this, DarkTrace 
[18], based in the UK, is among the world’s most advanced 
machine learning technologies for cyber defence and an 
advocate for using AI for safeguarding critical systems. 
Their Enterprise Immune System demonstrates the 
effectiveness of switching the security perimeter from an 
external ‘wall’ to an internal-facing adaptive model to 
improve security systems, threat detection and enhances the 
levels of data privacy. 
DarkTrace is testament to the fact that cyber-security 
techniques are trending towards the use of 
reactive/proactive systems rather than passive detection in 
order to deter attacks. Machine learning and data 
visualisation techniques are the technique of choice for 
establishing this security evolution. The concept is that 
security systems should respond to unknown intrusions, 
much like an organic-immune system. 
A. HOSPITAL NETWORKS 
Introducing complex machine learning algorithms to 
interpret patterns of behaviour in hospital networks is a 
considerable challenge. With healthcare networks, devices 
(medical, clinical and personal) are connected to global 
networks for convenient access using platforms, such as 
HomeLinks. Typically, modern healthcare networks are 
overly complex systems, with hospitals having their own 
unique structure. As an example, Figure 1 displays the data 
connections for the Active Directory Domain Controller 
(DC), Electronic Prescribing (EP) and Patient Administration 
System (PAS) at a Liverpool-based hospital. 
 
FIGURE 1.  Data connections for DC, EP and PAS systems at a 
Liverpool (UK) specialist hospital depicted by the Yifan Hu algorithm 
In Figure 1, a layout algorithm displays the data 
connections for DC, EP and PAS within a Liverpool 
Hospital network, demonstrating the complexity of the 
network data being analysed existing security applications 
(such as the IDS). In this case the Yifan Hu algorithm [19] 
is used to model the data connections. This is an approach 
typically used to present network data movement [20]. 
However, the data collected is only a snapshot of the 
network infrastructure using the network statistics (netstat) 
command-line in order to capture incoming and outgoing 
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Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Data. The DC data 
comprises 590 established connections of 5688 total ports. 
The EP data comprises18 established connections of 88 
total ports. The PAS data comprises 93 established 
connections of 173 total ports. The level of nodes and 
connectivity patterns demonstrate the challenge involved 
for data auditing and uncovering zero-day attacks, network 
weakness/flaws and emerging threats. The problem of 
enabling non-expert users to trust that the systems they use 
are secure when they do not have the technical capability to 
assess it themselves is not an easy problem to solve. 
B. EPR DATA IN HOSPITAL NETWORKS 
A sample of EPR data is presented in Table I. The full 
dataset contains 1,007,727 rows of audit logs. 
TABLE I 
EPR AUDIT SAMPLE DATA 
Date & Time Device ID User ID Routine Description Patient ID Duration (sec) Adm Date Dis Date 
16/02/28 00:00 362 865 Pharmacy Orders 58991 54 28-02-16 29-02-16 
16/02/28 00:02 923 199 Recent Clinical Results: (Departmental Reports).View Orders 17278 77 15-02-16 15-02-16 
16/02/28 00:02 103 677 Assessment Forms 4786 13 22-07-08 22-07-08 
16/02/28 00:02 103 677 Assessment Forms 4786 54 22-07-08 22-07-08 
16/02/28 00:04 923 199 Recent Clinical Results. View Orders 62121 147 08-02-16 08-02-16 
16/02/28 00:04 103 677 Assessment Forms | Visit History 14067 39 28-09-04 28-09-04 
16/02/28 00:04 845 1489 Pharmacy Orders 49304 22 23-01-02 23-01-02 
16/02/28 00:10 748 797 Recent Clinical Results: (Departmental Reports) 2166 20 28-01-16 28-01-16 
The data used in this research is from a specialist hospital. 
A large teaching hospital would have approximately 4 times 
the number of staff and would therefore have a proportional 
increase in data quantity. The task of navigating this data for 
anomalous activity is therefore considerable. 
The dataset presented consists of the following fields. 1) 
Date & Time: The date/time the patient record was accessed; 
2) Device (Tokenised): The name of the device the patient 
record was accessed on; 3) User ID (Tokenised): A tokenised 
representation of the User who accessed the patient record; 4) 
Routine: The routine performed whilst accessing the patient 
record (was the record updated, was a letter printed etc.); 5) 
Patient ID (Tokenised): A tokenised representation of the 
patient record that was accessed; 6) Duration: The number of 
seconds the patient record is accessed for (this number counts 
for as long as the record is on the screen, so may not always 
be an accurate reflection of how long the User was actively 
interacting with the data); 7) Latest Adm Date: The date the 
patient is last admitted to the hospital and 8) Latest Dis Date: 
The date the patient is last discharged from the hospital. 
From datasets such as this, usage patterns of the data 
access can be derived. For example, Figure 2 displays a 
comparison of the durations of routine activity for each user. 
The graph is extracted from a dataset of 1,515 unique User 
IDs and 72,878 unique Patient IDs. The visualisation is 
constructed using a logarithmic algorithm, outlined in (6). ݂ሺ�ሻ = ݈݋݃௕ሺ�ሻ 
(6) 
Where the base b logarithm of x is equal to f(x). In this 
sense, a logarithmic heat-map is appropriate as the log scales 
enable a significant range of coefficients to be displayed.  
 
FIGURE 2.  Heat-maps (logarithmic) comparing 1million rows of ID data 
to the duration of the patient record access 
Lower-scale values are not compressed down into the 
congested section of the graph where the unique values 
would be challenging to identify. 
The graph shows a consistent point density of up to 47,341 
patient records in the first row of the matrix, indicating that 
the majority of patient records are only accessed for fewer 
than 300 seconds (5 minutes). This would represent normal 
(expected) behaviour within the hospital (as revealed in 
consultation with the hospital). Whereas, 6 clusters (A-F) 
require investigation, as they represent users performing 
routines for over 16,000 seconds (4.44 hours), which would 
be classed as abnormal (unexpected) behaviour. This 
observation was identified by the Information Security 
Manager at the hospital that provided the dataset. 
Representing the data as a logarithmic heat-map is a clear 
approach for identifying data points of interest. However, the 
density of the dataset prohibits valuable insights from being 
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derived, and a real-time graph would be inefficient. The 
quantity of data prohibits all the data points from being 
visualised. In the following section, data normalisation, 
feature extraction and machine learning algorithms are 
applied to the dataset to detect abnormal EPR access. Once 
the dataset has been administered by these algorithms, 
visualisation techniques are applied. In doing so, the 
situational awareness of a patient privacy officer is enhanced. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The research is timely due to i) a fundamental switch in 
the technology being used by beneficiaries within health care 
infrastructures; [21] ii) the increased need for 24-hour data 
access; iii) GPs increasingly using Virtual Private Networks 
(VPN) and 3G connections; iv) Most UK hospitals have/are 
upgrading online EMIS-web, EMIS Health is used by over 
half of GP practices across the country and EMIS-Web 
allows hospitals access to primary care, secondary care and 
mental health data vi) more patient remote monitoring is 
taking security outside hospitals. Such trends reduce security 
levels and increases access to hospital networks and exposed 
APIs. 
The contribution of this research, (the novelty is further 
outlined in [22][4]) involves the use of Local Outlier Factor 
(LOF)-based data analytics techniques, an analyst-in-the-
loop and visualisation to safeguard EPR data. The system 
provides contextual awareness to detect anomalous 
behaviour within EPR audit activity, using the following 
multi-stage process:  
A. DATA PRE-PROCESSING 
In order to provide a meaningful visualisation, the dataset 
first undertakes a pre-processing phase. The audit data is 
stored by the EPR and captures every user interaction. Data 
is extracted into comma separated values format and stored 
in a database. 
1) FEATURE EXTRACTION 
Features of the EPR audit data are extracted for the LOF 
classification process. During the pre-processing stage, a 
statistical features based approach is implemented [23]. Four 
measures of central tendency’ are calculated through the 
Frequency, Mean, Median and Mode feature extraction 
process. Five measures of variability are calculated through 
the Standard Deviation, Minimum, Maximum, 1st Quartile 
and 3rd Quartile features. Finally, two measures of position 
are calculated through the 5th Percentile and 95th Percentile 
features.  
The resulting eleven features are extracted from the dataset 
for each ID (User, Patient, Device and Routine). Table II 
displays the features selected, with an accompanying 
description. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
DATASET FEATURE NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
Feature 
Name 
Feature Description 
Frequency The number of times the ID featured in the dataset 
Mean The ‘average’ ID value in the dataset. The sum of the durations 
for all values for a particular ID, divided by the frequency of that 
ID. 
Mode The value that appears most in the ID range 
Standard 
Deviation 
The measure of the dispersion of the ID range from its mean 
Minimum The data value that is less than or equal to all other values in the 
ID range 
5th Percentile The value below which the lowest 5% of the data falls 
1st Quartile The median of the lower half of the data set 
Median The value that separates the higher and lower half of the ID 
range 
3rd Quartile The median of the upper half of the data set 
95th 
Percentile 
The value above which the upper 5% of the data falls 
Maximum The data value that is greater than or equal to all other values in 
the ID range 
The mean (μ) is calculated using the equation outlined in 
(7). � = ͳ݉ ∑ �௜௠௜=ଵ  
(7) 
From this, the standard deviation (σ) is calculated using 
the equation outlined in (8): 
� = √ ͳ݉ ∑ሺ�௜ − �ሻଶ௠௜=ଵ  
(8) 
The remaining frequency, mode, median, minimum, 
maximum, 5th percentile, 95th percentile, 1st quartile and 3rd 
quartile are calculated using sort functions. For example, 
the mode employs the computation outlined in the 
following pseudo code (9). � = ݏ݋ݎݐሺ�ሻ; �݊݀�ܿ݁ݏ = ݂�݊݀ሺ݀�݂݂ሺ[�;  ݎ݈݁ܽ݉ܽ�]ሻ  >  Ͳሻ; [݉݋݀݁ܮ, �] = ݉ܽ� ሺ݀�݂݂ሺ[Ͳ;  �݊݀�ܿ݁ݏ]ሻሻ; ݉݋݀݁ = �ሺ�݊݀�ܿ݁ݏሺ�ሻሻ; 
(9) 
2) DATA CLEANSING 
Once the features are extracted, missing or null values 
(represented by an N/A in the dataset) are replaced with a 0 
then the Median value for that feature class. However, 
within the raw EPR dataset used in this research, no null 
values are present. 
3) FEATURE SCALING 
At this stage of the pre-processing, an example of the 
pre-scaled features dataset is displayed in Table III. In order 
to ensure the data conforms to a common scale for the 
classification, the features are scaled. 
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(a) (b) 
FIGURE 3.  (a) Min-Max scaling (b) Z-score normalisation 
The Min-Max approach scales the data to a fixed range, 
between 0-1. The normalised value is obtained using the 
method outlined in (10) and presented in Figure 3(a). ܯܯሺ�௜௝ሻ = �௜௝ − �௠௜௡�௠௔� − �௠௜௡ 
(10) 
Having a bounded range results in lower standard 
deviations and suppresses the effect of outliers. Decimal 
scaling normalises by moving the decimal point of values 
of feature �. Therefore, a ��ሺ�ሻ value is obtained using the 
method outlined in (11). ��ሺ�௜௝ሻ = �௜௝ͳͲ௖ 
(11) 
Where ݉ܽ� [\ሺ��(�௜௝)ሻ\] < ͳ and ܿ is the smallest 
integer. The Z-score normalisation approach rescales 
features so that they have the properties of a standard 
normalisation. The Z-score approach scales the data to a 
standard normal distribution. The scaled value is obtained 
using the method outlined in (12) and presented in Figure 
3(b).  �௜௝ = ܼሺ�௜௝ሻ = �௜௝ − �௝�௝  
(12) 
Where �௝ and �௝ are the sample mean and standard 
deviation of the jth attribute respectively [24]. 
B. MACHINE LEARNING 
Typically, for the analytic process a machine learning 
approach is considered. Machine learning emphasises the 
design of self-monitoring systems, which self-diagnose and 
self-repair [24]. The technique is commonly used in web 
search algorithms, spam filters, recommender systems, ad 
placement, credit scoring, fraud detection, stock trading, 
drug design and a number of other real-world applications 
[25]. 
Machine learning techniques principally consist of 
combinations of three components, Representation, 
Evaluation and Optimisation [25] where the data is 
modelled as a set of variables [26]. The following metrics 
are employed, a particular task T, a performance metric P, 
and a type of experience E. If a system reliably improves its 
performance P at task T, following experience E, then it can 
be said to have ‘learned’ [24].  
1) LOCAL OUTLIER FACTOR 
The system employs a density-based Local Outlier Factor 
algorithm. The Local Outlier Factor (LOF) process involves 
five stages [27]: 
i) k-distance computation: The Euclidian distance of the k-
th nearest object from an object p is calculated and defined 
as k-distance, where parameter k is the number of nearest 
neighbours.  
ii) k-nearest neighbour set construction for p: Set kNN(p) is 
constructed by objects within k-distance from p. 
iii) A reachability distance computation for p: Reachability 
distance of p to an object o in kNN(p) is defined as follows: ݎ݁ܽܿℎ − ݀�ݏݐ݇ሺ࢖, ࢕ሻ  =  ݉ܽ�{݇ − ݀�ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁ሺ࢕ሻ, ݀ሺ࢖, ࢕ሻ} 
(13) 
where d(p,o) is Euclidian distance of p to o. 
 
iv) lrd computation for p: Local reachability density (lrd) of 
p, defined as follows: ݈ݎ݀௞ሺ࢖ሻ = ݇∑ ݎ݁ܽܿℎ଴∈௞��ሺ࢖ሻ − ݀�ݏݐ݇ሺ࢖, ࢕ሻ 
(14) 
v) LOF computation for p: LOF of p is computed defined 
as follows: 
ܮ��ሺ࢖ሻ = ͳ݇ ∑ ݈ݎ݀௞ሺ࢕ሻ௢∈௞��ሺ࢖ሻ݈ݎ݀௞ሺ࢖ሻ  
(15) 
The LOF process exposes anomalous data points by 
measuring the local deviation. In other words, patterns in 
data that do not conform to the expected behaviour are 
revealed. In the case of EPR data, employing a LOF 
process is effective in that it recognises points, which are 
outliers from similar/related points in one area of the 
dataset. Therefore, the algorithm is particularly applicable 
to a dataset, where multiple job types/roles are present. It 
considers the relative density of points and can detect data 
in biased datasets. This means that it is advantageous over 
proximity-based clustering. LOF employs the relative-
density of a coefficient against its neighbours as the 
indicator of the degree of the object being an outlier [28]. 
If a global outlier is employed, the detection of irregular 
behaviours would not be possible without correlating the 
different hospital roles (as demonstrated in Table I) with 
each other, adding an extra stage to the detection process – 
one which might not be possible. This is due to the process 
that a global outlier detection process undertakes in 
identifying data points that are far from other points in the 
dataset.  
C. FEATURE TESTING 
Given the mean expressed in (7), the scatter matrix is the 
m-by-m positive semi-definite matrix. Where T denotes 
matrix transpose, and multiplication is with regards to the 
outer product [29], as expressed in (16). 
� = ∑ሺ�௜ − �ሻሺ�௜ − �ሻ� =௠௜=ଵ ∑ሺ�௜ − �ሻ ⊗ ሺ�௜ − �ሻ� =௠௜=ଵ (∑ �௜�௜�௠௜=ଵ ) − ݉���  
(16) 
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The scatter matrix, displayed in Figure 4 (all features 
have been abbreviated in the graph labels) visualises the 
relationship between the features to predict the most 
appropriate for the LOF classification.  
(a)   (b) 
 (c)  (d) 
FIGURE 4.  (a) Scatter Matrix of extracted features for UserID, (b) Scatter Matrix of extracted features for DeviceID, (c) Scatter Matrix of extracted 
features for PatientID, (d) Scatter Matrix of extracted features for Routine 
The scatter matrix displays the positive and negative 
correlation between the features. In this case, from the 
visual inspection, the majority of features have a positive 
correlation. However, based on Figure 4, the consideration 
would be to remove the feature Frequency for each Unique 
Identifier (FUID) for the UserID, Routine and Device 
Interaction classification but retain it for PatientID. 
Referring to the Routine and Device Interaction, the data 
collected relates predominately to unique routine 
combinations, so logically the FUID feature is less 
significant, as confirmed by the scatter matrix.  
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS 
A case study of actual EPR audit data is presented as an 
evaluation of the system methodology. This rich dataset 
contains 1,007,727 rows of audit logs of every user and 
their EPR activity in a single UK specialist hospital over a 
period of 18 months (28-02-16 – 21-08-17). The dataset 
contains four distinct ID types, User, Patient, Device and 
Routine. Each User ID, Patient ID and Device ID is 
tokenised by isolating the unique entries and assigning each 
value an incrementing number. This is done to anonymise 
the dataset. The Routine ID was not tokenised as it denotes 
the tasks performed by the User on the EPR for the 
interaction. For example, in the first row of Table 1, User 
865 accesses the ‘Pharmacy Orders’ function of the EPR on 
Patient 58991 whilst using Device 362. 
For every value of each of the four IDs, a LOF anomaly 
score was calculated. The LOF anomaly score measures the 
local deviation of density through determining how isolated 
the value given by k-nearest neighbours (k is set to 5). A 
LOF anomaly score of 1 indicates that an object is 
comparable to its neighbours and represents an inlier. A 
value below 1 indicates a dense region, and would therefore 
also be an inlier. A value significantly above 1 therefore 
indicates an outlier (anomaly). As all values within the 
range 0-1 are classified as inliers, values within the range 1-
2 were also classified as inliers. Any value above 2 was 
considered to indicate an outlier for the purposes of this 
experiment.  
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A LOF anomaly score is calculated by taking the number 
of variants according to the mathematical combination and 
is calculated using the equation in (17). As there are ten 
features, 45 LOF scores are calculated to account for all the 
feature combinations for every ID in the dataset. There are 
90,385 unique IDs in the dataset in total (for user, patient, 
device and routine combined), and a LOF score is 
calculated for the 45 combinations (of the 10 features) for 
each of the unique IDs in the dataset. Therefore 4,067,325 
unique LOF scores are calculated in total. Data cleaning is 
then performed on the LOF scores in order to convert the 
‘NaN’ and ‘Inf’ values. A NaN value indicates that a point 
has many neighbours in the same location, therefore the 
ratio of densities is undefined, and the points are not 
outliers. An Inf value occurs when a point is next to several 
identical points, but is not itself a member of that cluster, 
they are therefore ‘infinite’ and can be classified as 
anomalous. The NaN values are therefore assigned a value 
of 1, to indicate it is not anomalous, and the Inf values are 
assigned a value of 2, to indicate they are anomalous. The 
mean LOF scores for each ID is then calculated and the 
highest anomaly scores are presented in Table III and IV. ቀ݊݇ቁ = ݊ሺ݊ − ͳሻ … ሺ݊ − ݇ + ͳሻ݇ሺ݇ − ͳሻ … ͳ  
(17) 
A. USER, PATIENT AND DEVICE ID 
There are 1,515 unique User IDs, 72,878 unique Patient 
IDs and 2,270 unique Devices within the dataset. In Table 
III, IV, and V LOF identifies anomalous User IDs, Patient 
IDs and Device IDs. The neighbourhood radius is defined 
in stage 3 of the LOF algorithm (Section B, 1), the density 
score is defined in stage 4, and the anomaly score is the 
final LOF value, as defined in stage 5. 
TABLE III 
LOF (MEAN) ANOMALY SCORES FOR USER ID 
User 
ID 
Density 
Score 
Anomaly 
Score 
Neigbourhood 
Radius 
685 3.03 4.36 0.546 
260 5.73 3.54 0.518 
1037 69.14 2.80 0.251 
1002 46.81 2.61 0.051 
1401 16.55 2.56 0.153 
707 19.05 2.28 0.207 
1311 83.73 2.23 0.016 
242 77.78 2.13 0.024 
1493 47.75 2.03 0.134 
507 28.66 2.00 0.103 
Within the User ID range, the most notable ID is #685, 
with an anomaly score of 4.36. There are 10 User IDs with 
an anomaly score above 2. Therefore LOF has indicated 
that 0.66% of the User IDs are anomalous.  
TABLE IV 
LOF (MEAN) ANOMALY SCORES FOR PATIENT ID 
Patient 
ID 
Density 
Score 
Anomaly 
Score 
Neigbourhood 
Radius 
35888 371.74 9.41 0.006 
19327 175.92 8.81 0.018 
58816 794.70 8.58 0.003 
69053 51.59 8.55 0.053 
51280 765.21 7.61 0.003 
41306 150.01 7.53 0.014 
46695 647.07 7.32 0.008 
13704 1315.64 6.99 0.002 
34419 23.12 6.97 0.101 
56428 2570.47 6.94 0.003 
Similarly, the most notable Patient ID is #35888, with an 
anomaly score of 9.41. There are 122 Patient IDs with an 
anomaly score above 2, indicating 0.17% of the Patient IDs 
are anomalous.  
TABLE V 
LOF (MEAN) ANOMALY SCORES FOR DEVICE ID 
Device 
ID 
Density 
Score 
Anomaly 
Score 
Neigbourhood 
Radius 
2258 374.85 4.86 0.003 
1082 2.26 4.75 0.730 
1557 168.84 2.92 0.009 
729 5.26 2.80 0.303 
499 29.58 2.52 0.048 
527 6.84 2.43 0.206 
896 10.35 2.32 0.170 
2014 6.75 2.29 0.216 
1104 107.50 2.28 0.033 
523 17.38 2.25 0.077 
Finally, the most notable Device ID is #2258, with an 
anomaly score of 4.86. There are 12 Device IDs with an 
anomaly score above 2, indicating that 0.53% of the Device 
IDs are irregular.  Overall therefore, LOF identifies 0.45% 
of IDs as anomalous, which would be highlighted to a 
patient privacy officer for investigation. 
Examples of audit log data classified as inlier, outlier and 
abnormal data for User ID is presented in Table VI. Audit 
log data classified as an inlier within the dense region (<1) 
is User ID 571, with a LOF score of 0.95. Audit log data 
classified as an outlier within the normal region (>1 and <2) 
is User ID 1486, with a LOF score of 1.12. Audit log data 
classified as an outlier within the abnormal region (>2) is 
User ID 707, with a LOF score of 2.28. 
TABLE VI 
EPR AUDIT LOG DATA EXAMPLES FOR INLIER, OUTLIER AND ABNORMAL DATA POINTS FOR USER ID 
Date & Time Device ID User ID Routine Description Patient ID 
Duration 
(sec) Adm Date Dis Date 
17/03/08 01:32 2046 571 Visit History 33727 28 08/03/2017 08/03/2017 
17/08/07 15:37 396 1485 Current Medication Orders | Pharmacy Orders 62584 58 16/10/2001 16/10/2001 
16/05/30 11:09 936 707 Visit History | Radiology Reports | Maternity Data | Cancelled 
Account.UK.Letter | Cancelled Account.UK.Scheduling 
UK.View Orders 
28160 385 26/01/2016 26/01/2016 
The results presented here demonstrate a technique for 
uncovering anomalous or irregular behavioural patterns 
from a complex dataset that would otherwise not be 
possible from either a visual inspection/visualisation of the 
whole dataset (such as the heatmap presented in Figure 2). 
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B. ROUTINE ID 
However, the LOF technique cannot be applied as 
effectively to the Routine ID. Table VII presents a sample 
of the highest LOF anomaly scores for the Routine ID 
dataset. 
The EPR audit logs calculate a string of routines 
performed on the same patient as a unique Routine ID. The 
differing routines are delimited with a pipe (|). Therefore 
there are 13,722 Routine IDs in the dataset, whereas there 
are more accurately approximately 100 unique routines a 
user could perform. 
TABLE VII 
LOF (MEAN) ANOMALY SCORES FOR ROUTINE ID 
Routine Set Description Density Score 
Anomaly 
Score 
Neigbourhood 
Radius 
Assessment Forms | Maternity Data | Care-Area Administrative Data | Admissions Demographic Data 1043.094 13.34 0.003 
*** | UK.View Orders | Admissions Demographic Data | Pharmacy Orders 1649.703 11.64 0.005 
*** | Cancelled Account.UK.Letter | Admissions Demographic Data 2213.821 11.41 0.004 
Maternity Data | Theatre Management | Assessment Forms | Visit History 581.246 11.35 0.004 
Theatre Management | Cancelled Account.UK.Letter | Cancelled Account.UK.Scheduling | Admissions 
Demographic Data 632.774 9.70 0.005 
Recent Clinical Results | Recent Clinical Results:(Departmental Reports) | Pharmacy.Medication Order History 
| UK.View Orders 70.561 9.54 0.035 
Assessment Forms | Admissions Demographic Data | Visit History | Alerts 601.429 9.29 0.004 
Cancelled Account.UK.Letter | Pharmacy Orders | Admissions Demographic Data 470.423 8.81 0.005 
Assessment Forms | Cancelled Account.UK.Letter | Cancelled Account.UK.Scheduling | Medication Order 
History 646.410 8.32 0.006 
Internet Access | Alerts | Assessment Forms 693.934 8.22 0.005 
There are 102 routine sets with an anomaly score above 2. 
Therefore LOF has indicated that 0.74% of the routine sets 
are anomalous. The most notable routine set is the 
combination ‘Assessment Forms | Maternity Data | Care-
Area Administrative Data | Admissions Demographic Data’, 
with an anomaly score of 13.34. This specific routine 
combination only occurs twice in the audit logs of over 
1,000,000 rows. However, in order for the LOF scores for 
routine to be of value, each routine (rather than the routine 
combination) would need to be calculated. Unfortunately, 
this cannot be differentiated within the dataset. For example, 
if the LOF scores for each routine are calculated individually 
(rather than as a routine set), such as ‘Assessment Forms’ 
and ‘Maternity Data’, then these values can be compared 
with other instances of that routine, to determine whether 
certain log accesses are anomalous. However, as these cannot 
be separated within the combinations of routines, then an 
informative LOF score cannot be determined for Routine ID. 
C. VISUALISATION OF RESULTS 
A visualisation of the LOF results for each ID is 
presented in Figure 5. 
(a) (b) 
(c)     (d) 
FIGURE 5.  (a) Scattergraph of LOF results for UserID, (b) Scattergraph of LOF results for DeviceID, (c) Scattergraph of LOF results for PatientID, (d) 
Scattergraph of LOF results for Routine 
Through visualising the anomalies in this way, outliers 
can be highlighted to an analyst for scrutiny. In our 
visualisation engine, outliers in the top quarter of each ID 
range are highlighted as red, to be investigated as a priority. 
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Outliers in the 3rd quarter appear orange, and outliers in the 
2nd quarter appear yellow. This creates an interactive live 
task list for the analyst, with an anomaly priority ordering. 
Clicking on a point displays the ID number, which allows 
the analyst to investigate the activity associated with the ID. 
The display updates when new data is input and new LOF 
scores are calculated, providing a current view of 
anomalous EPR activity within a hospital. Activity such as 
insider threats (a staff member misusing their access 
privileges), or external threats (such as credentials accessed 
through social engineering and utilised for data 
exfiltration), can be investigated. In this way, the system 
provides situational awareness to aid patient privacy 
officers to monitor for malicious or unusual activity 
proactively.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The far-reaching consequences of this work are 
illustrated with a prediction: This research project will 
increase the situational awareness of data flow and actively 
address this issue of data misuse. Machine learning 
algorithms have the capability to observe and learn patterns 
of data and profile users’ behaviour, which can then be 
represented visually. The far reaching consequences of this 
work will result in the development of a system that can be 
used by healthcare practitioners to increase the protection 
of their EPR records. This will make the UK, not only one 
of the safest places to conduct business, but also one of the 
securest in protecting patient privacy in healthcare systems. 
Future Work will involve normalising the data further 
with a case study of the routine ‘Pharmacy Orders’. This 
routine accounts for approximately 21.27% of the actions 
performed on the EPR. It is therefore possible to use this as 
a case study to understand user roles within the dataset and 
compare similar actions, in order to identify anomalous 
behaviours. Factors other than solely the duration of the 
routine (such as the date and time an action is performed) 
will be considered. Additionally, a quantitative model-
based approach that takes into account the duration and the 
sequence of events during the interaction of the user with 
the EPR will be explored.  
The features discussed in the paper compare every 
activity performed associated with each ID, but without 
detail. For example, for each User it compares the duration 
of all actions performed for that user. This can broadly 
identify anomalous behaviour, but for a more nuanced 
approach, other factors can be taken into consideration. For 
example how long a user typically spends performing a 
certain task, or accesses a specific device, or with a 
particular patient. By calculating the local outlier factor for 
these behaviours, and assigning each a weighted score, 
these can be factored together to provide data-driven insight 
of potential EPR misuse. Additionally, currently inputting 
new data to calculate their LOF values is a manual process 
and not in real-time. This will be explored further with an 
aim to automate this and improve update efficiency within 
the big data context of EPR audit logs. 
Future work will also incorporate game theory through 
the use of an interactive visualisation. The vision is that the 
operator interacts with and manipulates the visualisation in 
order to set their own data parameters. This increases their 
situational awareness of the data flow within the healthcare 
infrastructure. Additionally, The Theory of Gamified 
Learning infers that gamification can positively affect 
learning and decision making through a more direct 
mediating process and a less direct moderating process 
[30]. Firstly, gamification affects learning via mediation 
when a user’s behaviour is encouraged in such a way that it 
itself improves learning outcomes, such as a fitness app 
[31]. The theory therefore mediates the relationship 
between game elements and learning. Secondly, 
gamification affects learning via moderation when pre-
existing information is improved through strengthening the 
relationship between instructional design quality and 
outcomes [32]. For the moderation theory, the moderator 
does not influence the outcome construct independently of 
the causal construct, therefore the pre-existing information 
must be of high quality, or the addition of gamification 
techniques would be of no benefit. Through the use of 
visualisation techniques to enhance the results of the local 
outlier factor results, gamification moderation theory is 
implemented.  
Supervised learning techniques will be implemented to 
compliment the unsupervised LOF scores. Access to 
labelled data for EPR audit logs is often not available or 
comprehensive. However, through displaying LOF results 
to an analyst, upon investigation the analyst can label the 
data as legitimate or illegitimate. Through this process, the 
combined use of unsupervised and supervised machine 
learning algorithms results in a semi-supervised approach to 
the challenge of detecting EPR misuse. Additionally, once 
semi-supervised techniques are employed, the accuracy of 
the algorithms in detecting outliers can be quantified 
through feedback from analysts. 
REFERENCES 
[1] ICO, “Data security incident trends,” 2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/data-security-incident-
trends/. [Accessed: 02-Oct-2017]. 
[2] D. F. Ferraiolo, R. Sandhu, S. Gavrila, D. R. Kuhn, and R. 
Chandramouli, “Proposed NIST standard for role-based access 
control,” ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 224–
274, Aug. 2001. 
[3] J. Stoll and R. Z. Bengez, “Visual structures for seeing cyber 
policy strategies,” in 2015 7th International Conference on 
Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace, 2015, pp. 135–
152. 
[4] A. Boddy, W. Hurst, M. Mackay, and A. El Rhalibi, “A Study 
into Data Analysis and Visualisation to increase the Cyber-
Resilience of Healthcare Infrastructures,” Internet Things Mach. 
Learn., 2017. 
[5] G. Zhao and D. W. Chadwick, “On the modeling of Bell-
LaPadula security policies using RBAC,” in Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for 
Collaborative Enterprises, WETICE, 2008, pp. 257–262. 
[6] Fair Warning, “How Privacy Considerations Drive Patient 
Decisions and Impact Patient Care Outcomes Purpose of the 
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2906503, IEEE Access
 Author Name: Preparation of Papers for IEEE Access (February 2017) 
VOLUME XX, 2018 10 
Study and Executive Overview Report,” 2011. 
[7] J. J. Walker, T. Jones, and R. Blount, “Visualization, modeling 
and predictive analysis of cyber security attacks against cyber 
infrastructure-oriented systems,” in 2011 IEEE International 
Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 
2011, pp. 81–85. 
[8] W. Hurst and C. Dobbins, “Guest Editorial Special Issue on: Big 
Data Analytics in Intelligent Systems,” J. Comput. Sci. Appl. 
Spec. Issue Big Data Anal. Intell. Syst., vol. 3, no. 3A, pp. 1–9, 
2015. 
[9] H. M. Chao, C. M. Hsu, and S. G. Miaou, “A data-hiding 
technique with authentication, integration, and confidentiality for 
electronic patient records,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Technol. Biomed., 
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 46–53, Mar. 2002. 
[10] Engineering and Physical Science Research Council, “Scheme to 
Recognise Academic Centres of Excellence for Cyber Security 
Research,” 2014. [Online]. Available: 
https://epsrc.ukri.org/research/centres/acecybersecurity/. 
[Accessed: 04-Apr-2018]. 
[11] Malvern Cyber Security Cluster, “Cyber Valley: Malvern Cyber 
Security Cluster.” [Online]. Available: https://www.malvern-
cybersecurity.com/. [Accessed: 04-Apr-2018]. 
[12] North West Cyber Security Cluster, “North West Cyber Security 
Cluster | Helping Prevent Cyber Crime.” [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nwcsc.org.uk/. [Accessed: 04-Apr-2018]. 
[13] H. Government, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021,” 
2016. 
[14] K. Veeramachaneni, I. Arnaldo, V. Korrapati, C. Bassias, and K. 
Li, “AI2: Training a Big Data Machine to Defend,” in 
Proceedings - 2nd IEEE International Conference on Big Data 
Security on Cloud, IEEE BigDataSecurity 2016, 2nd IEEE 
International Conference on High Performance and Smart 
Computing, IEEE HPSC 2016 and IEEE International 
Conference on Intelligent Data and S, 2016, pp. 49–54. 
[15] V. Stanovov, C. Brester, M. Kolehmainen, and O. Semenkina, 
“Why don’t you use Evolutionary Algorithms in Big Data?,” in 
IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, 
2017, vol. 173, no. 1, p. 012020. 
[16] A. Jindal, A. Dua, N. Kumar, A. K. Das, A. V. Vasilakos, and J. 
J. P. C. Rodrigues, “Providing Healthcare-as-a-Service Using 
Fuzzy Rule Based Big Data Analytics in Cloud Computing,” 
IEEE J. Biomed. Heal. Informatics, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 1605–
1618, Sep. 2018. 
[17] A. Barnett et al., “Image Classification using non-linear Support 
Vector Machines on Encrypted Data,” IACR Cryptol. ePrint 
Arch., p. 857, 2017. 
[18] 2017. Dean, T. and Stockdale, J., DARKTRACE Ltd, “Anomaly 
alert system for cyber threat detection,” 06-Feb-2017. 
[19] Y. Hu, “The Mathematica ® Journal Efficient, High-Quality 
Force-Directed Graph Drawing,” 2006. 
[20] M. Jacomy, T. Venturini, S. Heymann, and M. Bastian, 
“ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy 
Network Visualization Designed for the Gephi Software,” PLoS 
One, vol. 9, no. 6, p. e98679, Jun. 2014. 
[21] D. Rose and N. Joshi, The Digital Doctor: Hope, Hype, and 
Harm at the Dawn of Medicine’s Computer Age, vol. 71, no. 1. 
2018. 
[22] A. Boddy, W. Hurst, M. MacKay, and A. El Rhalibi, “A Study 
into Detecting Anomalous Behaviours within HealthCare 
Infrastructures,” 9th Int. Conf. Dev. eSystems Eng., 2016. 
[23] B. Esmael, A. Arnaout, R. K. Fruhwirth, and G. Thonhauser, “A 
Statistical Feature-Based Approach for Operations Recognition 
in Drilling Time Series,” Int. J. Comput. Inf. Syst. Ind. Manag. 
Appl., vol. 5, pp. 2150–7988, 2013. 
[24] T. M. Mitchell, “The Discipline of Machine Learning,” Mach. 
Learn., vol. 17, no. July, pp. 1–7, 2006. 
[25] P. Domingos, “A few useful things to know about machine 
learning,” Commun. ACM, vol. 55, no. 10, p. 78, Oct. 2012. 
[26] L. Buitinck et al., “API design for machine learning software: 
experiences from the scikit-learn project,” arXiv Prepr. arXiv …, 
pp. 1–15, Sep. 2013. 
[27] J. Lee, B. Kang, and S. H. Kang, “Integrating independent 
component analysis and local outlier factor for plant-wide 
process monitoring,” J. Process Control, vol. 21, no. 7, pp. 
1011–1021, Aug. 2011. 
[28] M. M. Breunig et al., “LOF,” in Proceedings of the 2000 ACM 
SIGMOD international conference on Management of data - 
SIGMOD ’00, 2000, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 93–104. 
[29] C. Croux and G. Haesbroeck, “Influence Function and 
Efficiency of the Minimum Covariance Determinant Scatter 
Matrix Estimator,” J. Multivar. Anal., vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 161–
190, Nov. 1999. 
[30] R. N. Landers, “Developing a Theory of Gamified Learning: 
Linking Serious Games and Gamification of Learning,” Simul. 
Gaming, vol. 45, no. 6, pp. 752–768, Dec. 2014. 
[31] J. Hamari, J. Koivisto, and H. Sarsa, “Does gamification work? - 
A literature review of empirical studies on gamification,” in 
Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences, 2014, pp. 3025–3034. 
[32] R. M. Baron and D. A. Kenny, “The Moderator-Mediator 
Variable Distinction in Social The Moderator-Mediator Variable 
Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, 
Strategic, and Statistical Considerations,” J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 
vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 1173–1182, 1986. 
 
